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Introduction 
 
 
The Ukraine Crisis and Control of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Impacts on German Arms Control Objectives 
Oliver Meier 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea will make it harder for Germany to achieve its disarma-
ment and non-proliferation objectives. Joint action by Russia and the United States to 
reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals appears unlikely in the medium term. And that 
reduces the chances of tactical nuclear weapons being included – as Germany would 
prefer – in a future arms control accord. While existing nuclear arms control agree-
ments have not thus far been openly called into question, they may yet become con-
sumed by the ongoing Ukraine crisis. Berlin should argue against NATO re-directing 
missile defences at a Russian threat. In order to prevent a further weakening of the 
nuclear non-proliferation treaty, Germany can emphasise the value of security guaran-
tees for non-nuclear-weapon states. 
 
As laid out in its coalition agreement of 
autumn 2013, the German government 
supports global efforts on arms control and 
disarmament of weapons of mass destruc-
tion. In particular, it cites NATO’s Novem-
ber 2010 decision to create the conditions 
for a world without nuclear weapons. By 
annexing Crimea, Russia has shattered the 
belief in close cooperation on nuclear arms 
control. 
Nuclear Arms Control 
Long before the Ukraine crisis, however, the 
Russian-US nuclear disarmament dialogue 
was stuck in a rut. Although both sides fol-
lowed up the New START treaty of 2010 
with working-level exploration of further 
disarmament steps, the US and Russian 
positions on scope, objectives, format and 
timeline for ongoing strategic nuclear 
disarmament in fact were – and remain – 
miles apart. 
In his June 2013 speech at the Branden-
burg Gate in Berlin, US President Barack 
Obama offered the Russians a reduction of 
about another third in the number of stra-
tegic nuclear weapons. Moscow failed to 
respond and is making a binding promise 
that US missile defence systems will not be 
used against Russia a precondition for any 
further discussion of nuclear disarmament. 
Moscow would also like talks to address the 
US superiority in modern long-range con-
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 ventional weapons, arguing that these 
systems may threaten its nuclear second-
strike capability. But the Obama Adminis-
tration, whose room for manoeuvre is 
limited by Congress, refuses to make such 
concessions. 
The Ukraine crisis has worsened the 
prospects for new disarmament steps. In 
early March, the United States stopped all 
military cooperation with Russia and sus-
pended the dialogue about possible cooper-
ation on missile defence. Washington has 
yet to state clear conditions for reversing 
that decision, but did announce it would 
review its bilateral agreements on estab-
lishing missile defence capacities in third 
states in the light of Russia’s actions in 
Ukraine. 
Moscow responded on 8 March, initially 
threatening to suspend inspections under 
the New START treaty and the Vienna Docu-
ment on transparency of conventional 
forces. But Russian deputy defence minister 
Anatoly Antonov back-pedalled just a few 
days later, declaring that Moscow would 
fulfil all its arms control obligations, at 
least as long as that served Russia’s national 
interests. 
It is unclear whether this status quo can 
last. On 25 March President Obama called 
Russia a regional power acting out of weak-
ness in Ukraine. This could hamper the 
arms control dialogue, because the United 
States is not in the habit of conducting 
bilateral nuclear disarmament talks with 
weak regional powers. The US press, con-
servative think-tanks and individual mem-
bers of the US Congress have demanded 
cancellation of existing arms control agree-
ments in response to the occupation of 
Crimea, sometimes arguing that the United 
States would be better placed than Russia 
to win a new arms race. 
The United States also demands that the 
Kremlin clarify whether the development 
of a new Russian cruise missile violates the 
1987 INF treaty that bans the possession 
and production of medium-range missiles. 
Russian refusal would further burden the 
arms control process. 
Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO 
In its coalition agreement the German gov-
ernment promises to work for the start of 
negotiations between the United States and 
Russia on complete and verifiable disarma-
ment of tactical nuclear weapons. It regards 
success in such negotiations as a precondi-
tion for any withdrawal of the tactical 
nuclear weapons stationed in Germany and 
Europe. 
Because of their short range, tactical 
nuclear weapons are a threat to European 
security. Russia’s stock of probably about 
2,000 operational sub-strategic weapons 
could represent a particular security risk 
because it is unclear how well they are se-
cured against theft or accidents. The future 
of the roughly 180 to 200 US tactical nuclear 
warheads that are probably deployed in 
Europe has repeatedly been a bone of con-
tention within NATO. Against that back-
ground Germany has long argued for a 
reform of NATO’s nuclear policy, even if 
NATO makes further reductions dependent 
on Russian concessions. 
The Russian annexation of Crimea has 
further diminished what were already 
small chances of restricting the role of tac-
tical nuclear weapons. In November 2013 
Russia had suspended talks on nuclear 
arms control in the NATO-Russia Council, 
blocking NATO’s plan to discuss a series of 
transparency- and confidence-building 
measures (TCBMs) with Russia. Such TCBMs 
were intended to pave the way for a reduc-
tion in tactical nuclear weapons. 
On 1 April NATO members decided to 
suspend civil and military cooperation with 
Russia but explicitly left open the possi-
bility of political discussions in the NATO-
Russia Council. 
The Ukraine crisis threatens to reignite 
the internal discussion within NATO about 
the value and future of nuclear deterrence. 
Certain central and eastern European states 
have been demanding that US nuclear forces 
should be based not only in the “old” NATO 
member states of Belgium, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands and Turkey, but also in 
some of the new member states. Such a 
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 move would represent a breach of the 
political promise made in the 1997 NATO-
Russia Founding Act: “The member States 
of NATO reiterate that they have no inten-
tion, no plan and no reason to deploy 
nuclear weapons on the territory of new 
members, nor any need to change any 
aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear 
policy – and do not foresee any future need 
to do so.” Given that even the call for sub-
stantial combat forces to be permanently 
stationed on Russia’s borders provoked 
great controversy between the allies, any 
proposal to deploy nuclear forces must 
be expected to generate strife. 
Missile Defence 
Until the Ukraine crisis the German gov-
ernment pursued cooperation with Russia 
on the missile defence question, guided by 
hopes that joint action and cooperative 
solutions would prevent the emergence of 
new tensions and arms races. 
To date NATO has justified the develop-
ment of a missile defence system exclu-
sively in terms of the (danger of) prolif-
eration of missiles and weapons of mass 
destruction. The United States recently 
explicitly cited the threat from Iran and 
Syria, against which NATO’s European 
Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) should 
protect the Alliance territory and popula-
tions. 
Certain NATO members, especially the 
central and eastern Europeans, also regard 
the stationing of US missile defence capa-
bilities as a means to reassure themselves of 
Alliance and especially US support. While 
Polish and Lithuanian representatives have 
called for a revision of the missile defence 
plans, for example by modifying the sys-
tem’s capabilities, in order to send a message 
to Russia, there has to date been little sup-
port for that line elsewhere within NATO. 
The US Secretary of Defence, Chuck Hagel, 
recently re-emphasised that NATO’s missile 
defence plans did not represent any threat 
to Russia, but added that a modification of 
the construction timetable was certainly 
possible (completion is currently scheduled 
for 2018). Missile defence was directed 
against real, not theoretical threats, Hagel 
argued. 
Moscow is aware of the ambivalence of 
NATO’s position. When the United States 
redeployed the first EPAA missile defence 
cruiser from the Mediterranean to the 
Black Sea in mid-April, Antonov accused 
NATO of breaking its promise. The redeploy-
ment of the USS Donald Cook, he said, con-
firmed that the planned missile defence 
was directed against Russia. 
Altogether, Moscow’s response to the sus-
pension of the missile defence dialogue by 
the United States and NATO was ambigu-
ous. Russian arms control experts initially 
dismissed the decision as “hot air”, and 
Russian deputy foreign minister Sergei 
Ryabkov concurred that cooperation with 
the United States would never have come 
about anyway. But in mid-April Russian 
President Vladimir Putin explicitly stated 
that Moscow was willing to conduct talks 
on questions of missile defence. In his 
address to the Duma on 18 March, too, his 
many complaints about NATO policies were 
accompanied by a declaration that Russia 
remained open for dialogue. 
Cooperation on Non-Proliferation 
The Ukraine crisis has had little impact 
on joint efforts with Russia to prevent the 
spread of nuclear, biological and chemical 
weapons of mass destruction. From the 
German perspective, it would be important 
for Russia and the United States to continue 
to cooperate on resolving non-proliferation 
problems. The destruction of Syria’s chemi-
cal weapons and a diplomatic resolution 
of the conflict over the Iranian nuclear pro-
gramme would be significant successes. 
During the first weeks of the Ukraine 
crisis it became clear that continued co-
operation between Russia and the United 
States on non-proliferation cannot be taken 
for granted. On 5 March, NATO Secretary-
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen announced 
after a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council 
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 that the Alliance was suspending the 
preparation of a joint NATO-Russia naval 
operation to protect the vessel destroying 
Syrian chemical weapons on the high seas. 
On 19 March, Ryabkov threatened that 
Russia might take “retaliatory measures” 
that could affect the E3/EU+3 talks about 
Iran’s nuclear programme in response to 
Western sanctions. 
In fact, however, Russia has continued 
to participate in efforts to destroy Syria’s 
chemical weapons, with a Russian naval 
vessel remaining part of the multinational 
force protecting two Danish and Norwegian 
ships removing the Syrian chemical weapons 
stocks. Nor have negative repercussions 
of the conflict in Ukraine actually been dis-
cernible in the nuclear talks with Iran. On 
the contrary, the talks – with Russian par-
ticipation – are actually going better than 
many would have predicted. 
The Obama Administration certainly 
has no interest in ending cooperation 
with Russia on control of weapons of mass 
destruction. In early April, it defied sharp 
criticism from individual Republican mem-
bers of Congress to confirm that it had 
successfully concluded negotiations with 
Moscow on a successor to the Cooperative 
Threat Reduction programme, which aimed 
to secure the nuclear, biological and chemi-
cal weapon legacy in Russia. The Adminis-
tration now has requested $100 million 
from Congress for the corresponding pro-
grammes. Rose Gottemoeller, US Under Sec-
retary of State for Arms Control and Inter-
national Security, defended the cooperation 
on 12 May, arguing that “We shouldn’t 
shoot ourselves in the foot in terms of stop-
ping or halting important national security 
work that prevents nuclear bombs from 
getting in the hands of terrorists.” 
It is unclear how non-proliferation ef-
forts through the G8 should be approached 
following the suspension of Russia’s mem-
bership of the group. Until that point, Russia 
had actively participated in the Global Part-
nership against the Spread of Weapons and 
Materials of Mass Destruction initiated in 
2002. In the early years, the Global Partner-
ship programmes concentrated on securing 
and decommissioning the Soviet Union’s 
WMD legacy. Over the years, Russia’s role 
shifted, from being a recipient to being a 
donor and the focus of the Global Partner-
ship increasingly moved to other topics, 
such as measures to improve biosecurity 
in the Global South. That reorientation 
process can now be expected to accelerate 
further. 
Security Guarantees and the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty 
The Russian occupation of part of Ukraine 
has grave effects on the credibility of secu-
rity guarantees for states that have re-
nounced nuclear weapons. By annexing 
Crimea, Moscow broke promises it made to 
Ukraine in 1994 in the Budapest Memoran-
dum. The guarantees were part of a deal: 
Ukraine signed the Nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapon 
state and promised to return to Russia all 
the nuclear weapons on its territory follow-
ing the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 
return, the United Kingdom, the United 
States and Russia promised to respect 
Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and 
existing borders. The three NPT depositary 
states explicitly promised to refrain from 
the threat or use of force and economic 
coercion. If Ukraine suffered aggression the 
three states promised to seek UN Security 
Council action immediately. 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and 
ongoing threat of military force against 
Ukraine are clear violations of the Budapest 
Memorandum. From the German perspec-
tive, this is deplorable from a non-prolifera-
tion perspective, too: States that have re-
nounced nuclear weapons, as well as those 
that the international community believes 
should do so, could conclude that any 
security guarantees given in exchange for 
such a pledge were worthless. That would 
seriously harm non-proliferation efforts. 
Security guarantees play a key role in efforts 
to resolve the two most fraught current 
conflicts, namely Iran and North Korea. 
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 Two factors might mitigate the damage 
done to global non-proliferation efforts by 
Russia’s violation of the Budapest Memo-
randum. Firstly, Iran and North Korea see 
their nuclear potential as a security coun-
terweight to the United States, not to 
Russia. Pyongyang and Tehran certainly 
fear American aggression more than 
Russian. 
But in response to Moscow’s violation of 
the Budapest Memorandum Washington 
has reiterated the importance of positive 
security guarantees and asked the Security 
Council to act as specified in the Memoran-
dum. It is important to emphasise that it 
is Moscow that has broken its promises, 
not the West. Such a response by NPT states 
parties could help to ensure that future 
security guarantees are not generally dis-
missed as worthless. A side effect of such 
an approach would be to reduce Russia’s 
prestige and role in resolving regional 
security problems. 
Secondly, the harm to non-proliferation 
efforts caused by the violation of the Buda-
pest Memorandum security guarantees is 
moderated by a fundamental difference 
between Ukraine and other acute prolif-
eration cases. Iran and North Korea, for ex-
ample, developed their nuclear programmes 
at considerable expense over many years 
and regard them as symbols of their na-
tional strength. Whether and under what 
conditions they will be willing to restrict 
their nuclear activities remains unclear. 
Ukraine, on the other hand, belongs to 
a special category of successor states that 
inherited parts of the Soviet nuclear arsenal 
in 1991. There is no basis for the argument 
that a nuclear-armed Ukraine would not, 
or at least not so easily, have fallen victim 
to Russian aggression. By 1992 Ukrainian 
leaders had already concluded that keeping 
even some of the 1,900 strategic nuclear 
warheads left in their country was not a 
realistic option. Retaining them would have 
incurred great financial and political costs 
in return for uncertain security benefits. 
The step to becoming a nuclear weapons 
state would have cost billions of dollars and 
permanently strained relations with Russia, 
as well as with the United States and other 
Western states. Lastly, Ukraine never actu-
ally possessed full control over the nuclear 
weapons stationed on its territory, but 
shared it with Russia. So in essence the 
question between 1992 and 1994 was not 
whether Ukraine would remain a nuclear 
weapons state but only the conditions for 
giving them up. 
That fact does not lessen the value of 
Russia’s security guarantees. But the con-
sequences of these guarantees being vio-
lated cannot be extrapolated directly to 
today’s proliferation candidates. 
Germany’s Role 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea has not fun-
damentally changed German arms control 
objectives. A renewed nuclear arms race 
between the two superpowers, which pos-
sess over 90 percent of the world’s more 
than 17,000 nuclear weapons, could re-
ignite dangers to European security that 
were overcome 25 years ago. For Germany, 
strengthening existing disarmament and 
non-proliferation instruments and treaties 
therefore remains a fundamental interest. 
Proliferation of nuclear, biological and 
chemical weapons can only be prevented 
through international cooperation based 
on clear rules and action against those that 
violate those norms. In advance of the NPT 
Review Conference in spring 2015, progress 
on nuclear disarmament – or at least the 
avoidance of setbacks – will become increas-
ingly important because many non-nuclear-
weapon states tie their own renunciation 
of nuclear weapons to general progress 
towards a nuclear-free world. 
But it has become more difficult for 
Germany to achieve progress on nuclear 
disarmament and control of other weapons 
of mass destruction. Trust in Russia’s reli-
ability and calculability has been deeply 
and permanently shattered. While arms 
control without trust is not impossible, it 
certainly facilitates the negotiation and 
implementation of agreements. 
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 In the wake of the Ukraine crisis Ger-
many will need to readjust its policies 
concerning control of weapons of mass 
destruction. 
Safeguard Arms Control Agreements 
In the near future nuclear arms control will 
have to return to its roots, which lie in the 
Cold War era. Cooperative arms manage-
ment rather than strategic partnership is 
likely to be the motto for a future dialogue 
with Russia on reducing nuclear weapons. 
Priority should be given to safeguarding 
existing nuclear arms control instruments 
like the INF treaty and the New START treaty. 
Both prevent an unfettered nuclear arms 
race. Experience also shows how hard it is 
to repair the harm caused by the cancella-
tion of existing agreements. Since the United 
States withdrew from the Anti–Ballistic 
Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) in 2002, conflict 
over US missile defence plans has stood in 
the way of increased cooperation between 
Moscow and Washington. And to this day 
no substitute has been found for the Treaty 
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 
after Moscow suspended implementation 
in 2007. 
Safeguarding the status quo should also 
be given priority when it comes to tactical 
nuclear weapons. On 3 and 4 June, NATO 
defence ministers decided to continue to 
operate on the basis of the NATO-Russia 
Act. At least in the medium term, it is thus 
unlikely that US nuclear weapons will be 
deployed on the territory of additional 
European countries. 
In the long term, NATO and Russia should 
continue to work towards opening a dia-
logue on reducing the importance of nuclear 
deterrence in European security. Tactical 
nuclear weapons no longer play any role 
in NATO’s operational planning, while US 
plans to modernise nuclear warheads and 
delivery systems stationed in Europe have 
always been politically controversial. 
NATO has homework to do to, while it is 
trying to create the conditions for a trans-
parency- and confidence-building dialogue. 
These would include revising outdated clas-
sification rules and a discussion of possible 
technical measures for verifying a future 
agreement on reductions of tactical nuclear 
weapons. Finally, the Alliance should also 
use the pause in talks with Russia to clarify 
the conditions under which it would be 
willing in principle to reform or to com-
pletely renounce nuclear sharing. 
Reconsider Missile Defence 
The Ukraine crisis also spotlights the 
question of the purpose of NATO’s missile 
defence plans. In advance of the 2010 Lis-
bon Summit, Germany based its support 
largely on the argument that cooperation 
on missile defences could be a “game 
changer” in the relationship with Mos-
cow. But that argument is now irrelevant, 
because the idea of a security partnership 
with Russia that would also enable cooper-
ation in a sensitive field like missile defence 
has been eclipsed by the Ukraine crisis. 
On the other hand, directing the missile 
defence project against Russia would be 
meaningless and politically counterproduc-
tive. From the technical perspective, the 
planned system would be incapable of offer-
ing effective protection against Russian 
missiles, especially since March 2013, when 
the United States abandoned the fourth 
phase that foresaw interceptors fast enough 
to stop intercontinental missiles. Politically, 
a reorientation of the EPAA would play into 
the hands of hardliners in Russia who seek 
an escalation of the confrontation with 
NATO. The United States would also be like-
ly to focus more sharply on the unanswered 
question of financial burden-sharing, if the 
EPAA ended up being tailored primarily to 
European rather than global threats. Wheth-
er the European allies would be willing to 
take on part of the US expenditures – esti-
mated at about $20 billion over the next 25 
years – for building and operating such a sys-
tem, may reasonably be called into doubt. 
Germany has an interest in the Alliance 
acquiring better protection against weap-
ons of mass destruction. Almost four years 
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 after the decision to build a NATO missile 
defence system it would be appropriate to 
evaluate the project’s scope, orientation 
and cost in view of the changing security 
situation. Such a discussion is incidentally 
also required in the context of a possible 
diplomatic solution of the conflict over 
Iran’s nuclear programme, given that a 
nuclear-armed Iran was to date the most 
important justification for the EPAA. 
Strengthen Non-Proliferation 
Joint efforts with Russia to prevent the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion are likely to continue on a cooperative 
basis. Both sides want to prevent more 
states, and especially terrorist groups, from 
gaining access to capabilities of mass de-
struction. At least to date, this joint inter-
est appears to have deterred them from 
breaking off cooperation. 
Germany is directly involved in the talks 
over the Iranian nuclear programme and 
should argue with its partners for Russia to 
remain involved. Admittedly, Moscow has 
always been a difficult participant in the 
talks with Tehran. But without Russia’s 
active involvement it is likely to be more 
difficult to achieve a compromise with Iran. 
Only Russia is currently supporting the 
Iranian nuclear energy programme, and 
the exclusive supplier of nuclear fuel for 
Iran’s only power-producing nuclear reactor. 
Iran and Russia have also declared their 
intention to expand civil nuclear coopera-
tion. If Russia is excluded from the talks, 
the value of a nuclear agreement with Iran 
will be smaller. 
Prevent Nuclearisation 
The Ukraine crisis has to date had little im-
pact on cooperation with Russia on matters 
of disarmament, arms control and non-
proliferation. This reflects first and fore-
most the fact that the prospects of further 
disarmament steps were already poor even 
before the Ukraine crisis. Secondly, all 
major actors have an interest in continuing 
cooperation with Russia where a concrete 
danger of proliferation of nuclear, bio-
logical and chemical weapons exists, such 
as in Syria or Iran. 
Thirdly the crisis itself has not to date 
acquired a nuclear dimension. Neither 
NATO nor Russia have brought their nuclear 
capacities into play to influence the course 
of the conflict. But the danger of nucleari-
sation cannot be entirely excluded. Since 
the outbreak of the conflict the United 
States and Russia have both conducted 
manoeuvres involving nuclear delivery 
systems. The United States, which explicitly 
placed its exercises outside the context of 
the Ukraine crisis, deployed nuclear-capable 
long-range bombers to Europe. At the begin-
ning of June, Russia conducted exercises 
with nuclear-capable short-range missiles 
in the western military district. In the con-
text of these manoeuvres, Russian officials 
referred to events last December, when 
Moscow said it would deploy nuclear-
capable Iskander-M missiles in Kaliningrad 
in response to NATO’s missile defence plans. 
An agreement between NATO and Russia 
to refrain from conducting such exercises 
or from changing the deployment of nu-
clear-capable delivery systems would repre-
sent an important confidence-building 
measure. Both sides could then build on 
such a step and use the spectrum of arms 
control instruments to promote a political 
dialogue. Europe would have most to lose 
from a collapse of the arms control archi-
tecture. During the Cold War, arms control 
frequently offered a starting point and a 
framework for political dialogue between 
the rivals. NATO and Russia should work 
together to ensure that that basis is not 
thoughtlessly thrown away in the current 
crisis. 
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